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Vote-Count Solutions in Georgia and the USA
Dec 19, 2006

Some Solutions are described here using:

   OTC - Over The Counter - Hardware and "open-source" Software programs   
Organizations Working on the Solutions:

http://www.openvotingconsortium.org
http://openvotingfoundation.org
http://openvotingsolutions.net
http://www.votetrustusa.org
University Voting Systems Competition
The Punch Scan System
http://blackboxvoting.org

 Other Organizations are Confronting the Problem Head-On with Necessary Litigation:
http://www.VoterGa.org/
Defenders of Democracy

One solution born in Macon shows how Georgia can use the Diebold-"Lemons System" to produce a high quality Lemonade

  Voter-verified, permanent paper record (pictured below) with a manual audit capacity as a safeguard against computer malfunction or deliberate software fraud. 
Below shows how to modify the existing DRE Diebold system. 
Also shown are the tools to create a better system from scratch.

 What Georgia Needs


Sample hardware to produce a DRE voting machine that also creates a voter-verified paper record:

Laptop

These cheap laptops have UPS - Uninteruptable Power Supply built in.  They have more than enough power.

This $228 printer is very robust.

This  $399 Touch-Screen Monitor is better than the current one used in Georgia.


We need a quick and effective remedy...

Immediate Solution is available:   (See pictures below) - Diebold's electronic vote machines can be reprogramed to print out a voter-verifiable  summary of the voter's choices.  Use the existing printer in uncovered mode.  The voter will return this paper to the pollworker . This voter-verified paper ballot will be placed in a lock-box for later use for recounts or routine callibrations.

Please call your Representative and Senators. Ask for them to support  Federal Legislation to fix the problem.

Please notice the paper printer that is located in each Diebold machine 

No receipt -

.  The printer is usually hidden under a Locked Panel that is visible here sitting behind the computer case.   The printer cover panel is uncovered during testing procedures and after voting is over. If the plastic panel had a small slit opening, it could easily spit-out a paper receipt for each and every vote.  Below is an example of verified-paper-ballot the machine can produce if using modified software:

Lemons into Lemonade

Place your verified paper ballot in the Ballot Box.

 This becomes the official record of your vote regardless of what the computer may output.

Verified paper ballot votes

 Any manual recount of the paper ballots takes precedence over the machine counts.  The paper trail is the legal and official vote.

http://www.uscountvotes.org

http://www.countpaperballots.com

http://www.verifiedvoting.org

http://blackboxvoting.org

http://blackboxvoting.com

http://www.countthevote.org

http://www.icountcoalition.org

Common Cause - Georgia



NIST Condemns Security Of Electronic Voting

Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, December 1, 2006; Page A01

Paperless electronic voting machines used throughout the Washington region and much of the country "cannot be made secure," according to draft recommendations issued this week by a federal agency that advises the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.

The assessment by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, one of the government's premier research centers, is the most sweeping condemnation of such voting systems by a federal agency.

In a report hailed by critics of electronic voting, NIST said that voting systems should allow election officials to recount ballots independently from a voting machine's software. The recommendations endorse "optical-scan" systems in which voters mark paper ballots that are read by a computer and electronic systems that print a paper summary of each ballot, which voters review and elections officials save for recounts.
.. . . . . .
NIST says that voting systems should not rely on a machine's software to provide a record of the votes cast. Some electronic voting system manufacturers have introduced models that include printers to produce a separate record of each vote -- and that can be verified by a voter before leaving the machine -- but such paper trails have had their own problems

. . . . .

Read more from the front-page article in the Washington Post here:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/30/AR2006113001637.html



Dear Fellow Americans,

I am one among many who have no confidence in the way that DRE Diebold electronic voting machines are used in Georgia. Did your vote count in the last election? The fact is that you don't know.  The actual count will remain forever unknown because a meaningful audit is not possible without a voter-verified paper ballot trail.

Diebold and the Georgia Secretary of State have decided to inactivate the paper printers during your vote. And the printout port is covered with a locked plastic panel until all voting is over.

The Diebold "faith based voting" system asks that we trust secret software and corporate impartiality. Faith based voting? Trust?  Trust has no place in competitive elections. 

Please call your Representative and Senators. Ask for them to support  Federal Legislation to fix the problem.

Sincerely,

- Lindsay D Holliday    Macon, Ga   December 2004, and 12-24-06

An Open-Letter to - Georgia State Senator - Cecil Saton

Sent: Friday, December 29, 2006 8:53 AM
Subject: Voting technology - open solutions are needed + Photo-Voter-Id - free and universal.




*Georgia Senator Staton*

Cecil,
The existing Diebold technology used in Georgia can use a webcam mounted on the voting machines to provide a "universal and free"  instant Photo-Voter-ID.
Just like used at the Instant-Teller-Money-Machines that are also made by Diebold...
Simple, effective and fair to both sides.
Thank you for your consideration,
- Lindsay

- blind copies to activists
Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2006 08:41:11 -0500
To: Letters@macontel.com
From: Holliday Dental <teeth@mindspring.com>
Subject: Voting technology - open solutions are needed 
Cc: Charles Richardson <crichardson@macontel.com>,  Phil Dodson <pdodson@macontel.com>, "Travis Fain" <tfain@macontel.com>, lfabian@macontel.com

Macon Telegraph Fax: 744-4663

Letters -

On December 19th, I attended a forum at Jessie Rice Elementary School  hosted by the State Election Board to review voting procedures in Georgia. 

The paper ballot experiment conducted by Diebold was reported to be awkward and difficult to audit.  Diebold has long maintained that paper ballots are too expensive and time consuming to be feasible.  So it is no surprise that their experiment became a self-fulfilling prophesy. Diebold hopes to continue their lucrative control of the Georgia vote counts by using only their trade-secret software. 

But that November failure by Diebold to serve up any useful paper ballots is actually a distraction from the most central issue here:

There is no excuse for any secret methods to be involved in the tabulation of our votes!    

Secret ballots? Yes.  Secret counting methods? No.

Voting system technology must be fully open to public scrutiny, and also to timely and independent verification and calibration. 

Numerous diverse groups across the US are working toward a number of creative solutions.  Links to further educate yourself, and to take action if desired are posted on-line here:

http://www.macon-bibb.com/votings.htm

- Lindsay D Holliday


_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 Lindsay  D. Holliday, DMD
(h) (478) 742-8699  3091 Ridge Ave. 31204
office 746-5695   360 Spring Street  Macon,  GA  31201 
cell 361-9526 is usually off
  http://www.hollidaydental.com


This page sponsored by:
  Lindsay 'Doc' Holliday  

me-mail

Holliday Dental Associates

360 Spring Street

Macon, GA 31201

office 478-746-5695

home 478-742-8699

  Macon-Bibb.com   

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